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Abstract
This paper studies the issue of moral hazard in the presence of
decentralized international risk sharing. In the model presented, risk
sharing is achieved through macro markets (markets in which claims
to the GDP of a country can be traded). Moral hazard arises for the
following reason: if foreigners hold claims to domestic GDP due to
risk sharing motives, the country will not receive the full bene…t from
its production anymore. This can motivate for example a tax on in-
vestment (which reduces production) or simply result in reduced gov-
ernmental e¤ort to increase productivity. We show in a two-country
general equilibrium framework that the moral hazard problem does
not lead to a reduction in the risk sharing (households hold half of
world output). This results ultimately in a 100% tax on investment
and creates a huge distortion. We conclude that unregulated macro
markets pose a serious threat to world welfare. The analysis also raises
concern about the desirability of decentralized risk sharing in general,
in particular risk sharing through international trade of equity.
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1 Introduction
Do governments face changed incentives when domestic agents have interna-
tional risk-sharing agreements? How would this feedback into markets for
risk sharing? And, what are the consequences for the desirability of such
risk sharing agreements? These questions are of particular interest against
the background of an increasing international asset diversi…cation and the
possible introduction of macro markets. In these markets, as originally pro-
posed by Shiller (1993), assets are traded of which the dividends are linked to
macroeconomic indexes such as for example the GDP of a country. Individ-
uals and …rms can use these assets in order to insure the part of their income
which is a¤ected by aggregate factors. There is a wide range of studies on
the potential gains from such risk-sharing,1 some estimated being large and
in the range of up to 3.5% of permanent tradeables consumption for a 50
years horizon.2
The purpose of this paper is to examine the above raised questions in a
world in which international risk sharing can be achieved through such macro
markets. The basic idea why the government plays a role is the following: if
individuals insure national output through macro markets then the govern-
ment has an incentive to carry out policies at the cost of reducing output
(moral hazard).3 Due to the complexity of these policies, the government
cannot credibly commit. Rational individuals take this into account and
may adjust their risk-sharing activities accordingly.
The issue of moral hazard on the side of the government caused by macro
markets has to the knowledge of the author not yet been treated in the
literature. There is, however, a large literature on moral hazard and hidden
information problems caused by international risk sharing in general. The
imperfections arise there (among others) because states of nature cannot be
observed by all parties and thus a country or an individual is tempted to
claim that it was hit by an adverse shock even if it is not (e.g., Green[1987]
and Taub[1990]) or because e¤ort (or analogously investment) can change
payo¤s or the likelihood of the states (Greenwood and Williamson [1989]
1See for instance Lucas (1987), Cole and Obstfeld (1991), van Wincoop (1994) and
Tesar (1995).
2van Wincoop (1999)
3Although the government is not in the typical moral hazard situation (it is neither
part of a contract nor the agent who can actually change the pay-o¤ of the contract), it
will be in the following referred to moral hazard since the arising incentives are similar.
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and Atkeson[1991]). If this is the case and for example investment is private
information, there is an incentive to underinvest since with risk-sharing the
agents do not fully participate in the marginal bene…t of their investment.
This is in principal the same source of moral hazard as in the model here. For
the purpose of the paper the literature can be divided in two classes: models
in which the risk sharing is obtained via central agreements (usually between
governments) and models in which individuals enter risk-sharing agreements
(e.g., through international borrowing and lending).4 In the former class, the
moral hazard arises on the side of the government which can for example
reduce its e¤ort to raise output; in the latter where risk sharing is achieved
by individuals, typically the individuals itself are subject to opportunism.
What these models …nd is that the given imperfections reduce the potential
gains from risk sharing or that risk sharing does not take place at all. All
in all, risk sharing in this studies does not lead to a welfare reduction (with
homogenous agents). The case of macro markets falls in the latter class: risk
sharing is obtained by individuals. However, in contrast to the above studies
the government is subject to moral hazard problems because it can directly
or indirectly in‡uence the payo¤ of the risk sharing assets. In principal, such
a setting also applies to the analysis of international borrowing and lending
or foreign direct investment between private agents (for a survey see Eaton
and Fernandez[1995]). In these models, however, the risk sharing is obtained
by contracting on individuals assets (e.g., a …rms equity) in contrast to macro
markets, where aggregate risks are shared. Again, these models …nd welfare
improvements or break down of the markets. The novelty of the analysis of
this paper is thus that it examines international risk sharing in aggregate
risks in combination with the fact that the risk sharing is obtained on an
individual basis. It will be shown that this causes important intranational
externalities which do not arise in the other models and leads to adverse
welfare e¤ects.5
4The distinction itself is not particularly relevant for analysis: Green (1990) and Taub
(1990) can be put into the former class, Atkeson (1991) and Greenwood and Williamson
(1989) into the latter. See Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1996), chapter 6 for further references.
There is also large literature on risk sharing within federal constitutions which poses
similar problems. See for example Bordignon, Manasse and Tabellini (1996) and Persson
and Tabellini (1996). The latter provides a rich positive analysis of moral hazard problems.
5The setup can be viewed as an extended principal-agent-relationship, where the foreign
insurer is the principal and the domestic household is the agent. Additionally, domestic
agents have their own agent (the government) who has no self-interest (government is
benevolent).
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There are further studies explicitly addressing time inconsistency prob-
lems in connection with international risk sharing, i.e., in the setting of
foreign investment and international lending (Eaton and Fernandez[1995]).
Time inconsistency can arise because the government, after investment has
taken place, taxes the foreign capital. Foreign investors anticipate that and
depending on whether it is possible to solve the time inconsistency problem
risk sharing takes place or breaks down. Throughout the paper it is assumed
that the government cannot commit at all. The reason is that for the type
of moral hazard considered here it is di¢cult for the government to commit
to a certain behavior, simply because potential government actions are so
rich that they cannot be fully observed by other parties. Hence the scope for
reputational arguments is limited and the time inconsistency problem cannot
be resolved. Somewhat surprisingly, it turns out that this does not a¤ect the
amount of risk sharing.
Generally, the scope for international risk sharing may be limited through
the problem of the enforceability of the underlying contracts. These issues
have been dealt with extensively in the literature (for references for the case
of sovereign default, see Obstfeld and Rogo¤[1996], chapters 6.1. and 6.2.).
It will be argued below that settlement for the here considered risk shar-
ing contracts can be constructed such that enforceability problems do not
arise. The analysis thus assumes the enforceability of risk sharing contracts
conditioning on aggregate output.
This paper adds moreover to the literature on asset pricing and moral
hazard in the presence of incomplete markets. There the question is posed
whether the existence of assets which are subject to moral hazard (for exam-
ple if the owner of a …rm issues shares) leads to constrained pareto-optimal
allocations.6 A number of studies …nd that this is true if asset trades are ob-
servable.7 The setup di¤ers from the analysis here in that there the pay-o¤
from the asset is solely under in‡uence of the individual which engages in
the market; in the setup discussed here a third party (the government) can
indirectly change the pay-o¤s from the assets by changing the economic en-
vironment of the households. It will be of interest whether the results carry
6Constraint pareto-optimality refers there to the fact that the allocation is e¢cient
given the imperfections being present: the moral hazard and the incompleteness of the
markets.




The paper addresses the issue by studying the general equilibrium of a
simple two-country model where production is subject to country speci…c
shocks. There exists a market in which a swap in the countries’ output
can be traded (the macro market). As an example for policies which a¤ect
output, the government can levy taxes on investment. By doing so, the
government can increase current consumption but reduces future output.
The latter e¤ect is partly compensated through increased payments from the
risk sharing assets.
The solution to the model reveals that the government’s decision regard-
ing the tax does not a¤ect the quantities traded in the swap at all. The
intuition for that is that households price any expected taxation into the
swap, hence expected pay-o¤s are zero but the swap still has its value for
the individuals in terms of risk-sharing. Thus in equilibrium, the classical
result that households hold equal shares of world output (as they would do
without government inference) still holds. As a consequence, the government
imposes a capital tax (100%) since it wants to internalize externalities and
the resulting distortion leads to a welfare reduction. The externalities arise
because additional investment of a household increases the countries’ output
and thus reduces payments from the swap for all domestic households (if the
countries were populated by a single household, they would choose not to
take any positions in the swap). The 100% taxation stems from the fact that
with half of the output swapped, only half of every additional unit of pro-
duction remains in the country. Thus, in order to make investment bene…cial
for the country, marginal productivity has to be twice as high as in the case
without risk sharing agreements. A capital tax of 100% exactly ensures this
condition. Since the optimal taxation only depends on the share of output
swapped, no speci…c assumptions about utility and production functions are
needed to obtain the results.
To the knowledge of the author, the result of a welfare reduction due
to a new asset is new to the literature on international risk sharing. The
result arises because of the separation of the individual who actually enters
the risk sharing agreements from the person who is subject to moral hazard
8There is also a branch of literature emphasizing the role of the government in in-
complete markets. However, the scope for government activity there is very di¤erent:
government intervention through taxation can be justi…ed in that it can improve e¢-
ciency through equalizing marginal rates of substitution (Newbery and Stiglitz[1982] and
Stiglitz[1982]).
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combined with the fact aggregate risk sharing instruments are traded. The
…ndings challenge further results from the incomplete market literature (i.e.,
Magill and Quinzii [1998]): if there is a body that can in‡uence the pay-o¤s of
the assets (e.g., a government through capital taxation), constrained pareto-
optimal allocations may not be achieved. This is particularly interesting,
since these studies aim at examining the equity premium puzzle and the home
bias puzzle (Kahn[1988], Kocherlakota[1998]). Whether this can potentially
have consequences for these puzzles is left for future research.
How robust are the results? The papers considers some modi…cations
to the original setup and …nds that the high capital tax is not sensitive to
the changes. Moreover, capital taxation is only one of the means of a gov-
ernment reacting to the risk sharing, similar results would arise for example
for a labor tax. Further, countries may be a¤ected di¤erentially, thus there
may be the case of some countries gaining (while world welfare is reduced).
Given this …nding and recognizing that there is an incentive for private orga-
nizations to introduce the macro markets, the paper turns to the analysis of
policy measures which aim at avoiding the detrimental e¤ects of the markets.
Such measures are the extension of the terms of the swap-contract in order
to change the incentives for the government and the addition of more risk
sharing assets to the economy. Alternatively, the payments from the risk
sharing assets could be made contingent on an evaluation of an international
institution which watches the government. It turns out that the issues are
fairly complicated and no readily available advice can be given, the analysis
calls for more research into that area. Finally, the discussion suggests that
a regulation of the trade in the markets is also not a straightforward issue
since in order to be e¤ective it requires international coordination.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the
model and describes its solution. Section 3 considers then some extensions
to the model. In section 4 implications of the results for policy are discussed.
The …nal section concludes.
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2 The Model
2.1 A World Economy With An International Macro
Market
The paper concentrates on the simplest setup in which there is international
risk sharing due to asset markets and a government which can change house-
holds incentives. Speci…cally, the general equilibrium of a two country, two
period model where each country (A;B) is populated by a continuum of
identical households (with measure 1) will be studied.9 Each household has
an initial endowment y0 of a single perishable good. Countries are identical.
The endowment y0 can be consumed in the …rst period (c1) or invested: either
in an international bond market (b) or in capital for home production (k).
Investment in bonds yields a risk-free return of (1 + r) in the second period.
Returns to home production are subject to shocks, which are country speci…c.
Labor is supplied inelastically by the households. More precisely, an invest-
ment ki of household i in country A results in a production of f(kAi )(1+ "
A),
analogous for country B in f(kBi )(1 + "
B). The shocks "A and "B are nor-
mally distributed with variance ¾2 and zero mean; they are assumed to be
uncorrelated across the countries.10 The households maximize their expected
two-period utility, which is assumed to be time separable.
There exists an international macro market where households can trade
a future in period 1. This future (or swap) is a claim to the di¤erence of the
outputs in the two countries fB(1 + "B) ¡ fA(1 + "A) in period 2, where f
is the average output
R
i2[0::1] f(ki)dki. The maturity price of the swap is p.
Settlement takes place in the second period after uncertainty about output is
resolved. The motivation for the introduction of the swap is that households
can use it in order to diversify and thus reduce the volatility of their second
period consumption by shorting own output and investing the receipts into
claims to foreign output.11
The governments in the both countries maximize their re-election prob-
9The model of the asset market is a simpli…ed version of Shiller and Athanasoulis
(1997).
10None of the results below will change unless the shocks are not perfectly correlated.
Increases in correlation will just mean a reduction in the potential gains from risk-sharing.
11Since their is only one risk sharing asset available, households are forced while buying
claims to the other countries output to go short in their own countries’ output. This
assumption will be later relaxed in section 3.
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abilities, which are increasing in the utility of the domestic households. The
policy instrument of the government is a tax t on (domestic) capital. Tax
receipts are given back to the households in the same period by means of
a lump sum payment T (in absence of international risk-sharing there is of
course no motive for taxation).
The timing of the actions in the model can be summarized as follows: in
period 1 households take their positions in the future q (subperiod 1), then
the government announces the tax rate t (subperiod 2). Based on the tax
rate, households then make their consumption (c1) and investment decisions
(b and k) (subperiod 3). In the second period, the uncertainty is resolved,
the futures are settled and the households consume their resulting budget
(c2).
The budget equations for household i in country A (analogous for country
B) for period 1 and 2 are (choice variables are indexed by i):
cAi;1 + b
A
i + (1 + t




i (1 + r) + f(k
A
i )(1 + "
A) + qAi [f
B(1 + "B)¡ fA(1 + "A)¡ p] (2)
The government balances its budget, thus TA = tAkA and TB = tBkB.
Market clearing for the bond market requires bA = ¡bB and for the swap
qA = ¡qB (k; b and q refer to the country wide average of the respective
individual variables ki; bi; qi).
2.2 Optimal Consumption and Investment Plans
The model will be solved in reverse chronological order. In subperiod 3,








(where ¯ is the discount factor and E1[¢] the expectation operator conditional
on information in period 1) subject to their swap positions qAi , the tax rate
tA and the budget equations (1) and (2). Optimal choice of bonds bAi and











= 0! ) (1 + tA)u0(cAi;1) = ¯E1[u0(cAi;2)f 0(kA)(1 + "A)] (5)








i )¡ qAi fA)] (6)
The last term in equation (6) appears since investment in capital is risky
and thus requires a higher expected return.
2.3 Capital Taxation
In subperiod 2, the government sets the tax rate on capital such as to max-
imize the welfare of the country. The scope for government activity arises
because of the negative externalities of investment between domestic house-
holds: a higher investment in capital of a household increases the expected
output of the country which in turn lowers the payments of all households
of the country from the swap contracts (if households are short in their out-
put). The government in country A thus maximizes utility by internalizing
the externalities given the average swap positions qA (the latter determining
the size of the externality). Since households are homogenous, they all face
the same optimality conditions and their decisions are thus identical in equi-
librium (individual values are interchangeable with average values). Hence,
the government simply maximizes the expected utility of an arbitrary house-
hold. To determine the optimal taxation of the government in country A,
consider the country consisting of one household only. Externalities are obvi-




i (1 + r) + f(k
A
i )(1 + "
A) + qAi [f
B(1 + "B)¡ f(kAi )(1 + "A)¡ p] (7)
12Stein’s lemma states that if two random variables X and Y are jointly nor-
mal distributed and E[Y ] = 0 and f(¢) is a continuous function then E[f(X)Y ] =











i ) ¡ qfA)):
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with the only di¤erence to equation (2) being that the household can now
in‡uence the pay-o¤ from the swap due to his own investment decision. The
corresponding …rst order condition is then:
u0(cAi;1) = ¯(1¡ qAi )f 0(kAi )E1[u0(cAi;2)] + ¾2E1[u00(cAi;2)](1¡ qAi )f(kAi )) (8)
If the government sets the tax-rate to 1+tA = 1=(1¡qAi ) then equation (6)
is identical to (8), that is the households face the same optimality condition
as in the case with internalized externalities (one household). Since qAi = q
A
in equilibrium, the optimal tax rate in country A is
tA = qA=(1¡ qA) (9)
and depends only on qA. As mentioned above, in a world without con-
tracts (qA = 0), the government would set the tax rate to zero re‡ecting the
absence of externalities. Furthermore, the optimal tax-rate rises with the
share of national output insured by contracts (qA) due to an increase in the
externalities between the households (identical analysis applies to country
B).
2.4 Equilibrium in the Swap-Market
In the beginning of the …rst period (subperiod 1), the households take posi-
tions in the macro market. In equilibrium they anticipate the tax rate tA.











while second period budget equation (2) does not change. The optimal





= 0! ) E1[u0(cAi;2)(fB(1 + "B)¡ fA(1 + "A)¡ p)] = 0 (11)




B ¡ fA ¡ p) + ¾2E1[u00(cAi;2)](qAi ((fB)2
+ (fA)2)¡ fAf(kAi )) = 0 (12)
2.5 Properties of the Equilibrium
Having stated the optimality conditions of all agents, it will be now proceeded
to obtain a solution for the equilibrium swap positions. Setting f(kAi ) = f
A
in (12) and dividing (12) by E1[u0(cAi;2)] one obtains
fB ¡ fA ¡ p¡ ¾2°(cAi;2)(qAi ((fB)2 + (fA)2)¡ (fA)2) = 0 (13)
where °(cAi;2) = ¡E1[u00(cAi;2)]=E1[u0(cAi;2)] is the coe¢cient of absolute risk-
aversion. Solving equation (13) for p and setting qAi = q
A and cAi;2 = c
A
2 yields
p = fB ¡ fA + ¾2°(cA2 )((fA)2 ¡ qA((fA)2 + (fB)2)) (14)
Thus the price of the swap is the di¤erence between the expected output in
the both countries (fB ¡ fA) plus a term which arises because the contract
can be used to diversify and thus reduces risk for households in A. For
country B the corresponding equation is
p = fB ¡ fA + ¾2°(cB2 )(¡(fB)2 ¡ qB((fA)2 + (fB)2)) (15)
Substituting in (14) and (15) for the price p and using the market clearing
condition qA = ¡qB yields an equation for the number of swap positions q
q = qA = ¡qB = °(c
A
2 )(f
A)2 + °(cB2 )(f
B)2





The right side of (16) is positive, thus countries diversify by taking short
positions in their own output (and thus long positions in the output of the
other country). Generally, q is higher than 1=2 if the country with the higher
expected output also has the higher absolute risk aversion and lower than
1=2 if the country with higher output has a lower degree of absolute risk
aversion.13 To simplify the further analysis it is assumed that the countries
13Proof: see appendix A.
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have constant absolute risk aversion °(cA2 ) = °(c
B
2 ) = °.
14 Equation (16)
then simpli…es to
q = qA = ¡qB = 1=2 (17)
Thus, the amount of output insured in equilibrium is independent of the
government actions, that is the tax rate. From (14) one obtains an equation
for the maturity price




The contract has a premium above the expected output di¤erences fB ¡
fA if and only if fA > fB.15 Next it will be solved for the equilibrium tax
rate, the ratio of output between the countries and the price of the contract.
Equation (9) shows that for q = 1=2
tA = tB = 1 (19)
thus investment is penalized by a capital tax of 100%. Further, the in-
tertemporal ratio of marginal utilities of consumption is equalized between
the countries through the bond market (this can be seen by writing equation
(4) also for country B):
u0(cA1 )=E1[u
0(cA2 )] = ¯(1 + r) = u
0(cB1 )=E1[u
0(cB2 )] (20)
Rearranging the condition for optimal investment in capital (5) for both
countries and dropping the subscripts i one gets a alternative expressions for





[1¡ ¾2°(1¡ qA)f(kA)] (21)
14For the general case of risk-aversion, the symmetric solution as outlined below still
exists, but may not be unique. To check the existence of the symmetric equilibrium, note
that °(cA2 ) has then to equal °(c
B
2 ) which will result in q = 1=2 (equation (16)).
15The intuition for that is that when fA > fB the households of country A have poten-







[1¡ ¾2°(1 + qB)f(kB)] (22)







For f 00(k)  0 a solution to this equation requires kA = kB. To see
that, note …rst that nominator and denominator of the right-hand-side of
equation (23) are larger than zero since otherwise the marginal utility of
capital in terms of more second period consumption is negative as can be
seen from equation (22). Imagine now an equilibrium with kA > kB: the
right-hand side of (23) is then smaller than one, while the left hand side of
the equation is at least one, thus ruling out solutions with kA > kB (and vice
versa solutions for kA < kB). Hence, the households in both countries invest
the same amount of capital; thus expected output is also be equal. From (18)
it can be then seen that there is no premium on the swap: p = fB ¡ fA = 0.
Since the solution is symmetric in every respect, there can be no net holdings
of bonds of the households in either country, thus bA = bB = 0:
2.6 Discussion of the Results
The non-zero capital taxation stems from the two externalities present in
the model. One externality, as already mentioned, is posed by the capital
investment decision: investment by a household raises average output and
thus reduces the payments from the swap for all households in the coun-
try. The government internalizes this externality by levying a capital tax on
investments depending on the size of the externality (the externality is the
higher, the higher the amount of shorted output). The second, less direct,
externality originates from trading in the macro market: as a household goes
short in its own countries output, this causes the government to increase
taxes in order to internalize the …rst externality and leads so indirectly to
a distortion in each households investment decision.16 This externality can-
not be internalized in the model, hence the distorting taxation arises. Since
16If both countries were populated by a single representative household only, none of
the externalities would be present and the households would in equilibrium hold no swaps.
This would result in constrained pareto-optimality.
13
the households choose in equilibrium to diversify by shorting half of its own
countries output, a capital tax of 100% is needed to internalize the …rst ex-
ternality. The intuition is as follows: additional production is only welfare
enhancing if the marginal productivity is at least twice as high compared to
the equilibrium of a world without macro markets (since half of the addi-
tional output goes to the other country). Regarding the change in welfare
of the countries as represented by the utility of a household, there are two
e¤ects: …rst, expected utility increases since the variance of second period
consumption can be reduced by 1=2.17 Second, there is a reduction in welfare
because of a distortion of the production due to the capital tax. The latter
e¤ect dominates if the risk-aversion is low, because then the …rst e¤ect is
very small while the second remains the same (countries swap half of their
output independent of the size of the risk-aversion) but welfare may increase
if risk-aversion is high (for the case of quadratic utility and a standard de-
viation of output of 10%, appendix B shows that there will be a welfare
reduction for all admissible values of the risk aversion). For ’real’ economies
it is clear that there are losses due to a punishment of investment by a 100%
capital tax. The allocation is thus no constrained pareto-optimal.18 It is
exactly the externality problem (which arises because the swap contracts
on aggregate values rather than individual ones and the fact that the risk
sharing is obtained by individuals) that makes the prediction of the model
di¤erent from other models of moral hazard and risk sharing. If, alterna-
tively, the governments would enter the aggregate risk sharing agreements
(as in Green[1987]) or individuals enter risk sharing agreements conditioning
on individual output (e.g., Kocherlakota [1998]), they would realize that the
more they wish to insure, the lower claims to their output would be valued.
This is the case because the investors realize that with an increasing de-
gree of insurance the moral hazard problem rises and price this into the risk
17From budget equation (2) one obtains:
q = 0 ) V ar(cA2 ) = V ar(bA(1 + r) + f(kA)(1 + "A)) = ¾2(fA)2
q = 1=2 ) V ar(cA2 ) = bA(1 + r) + f(kA)(1 + "A) +
qA[f(kB)(1 + "B) ¡ f(kA)(1 + "A) ¡ p]
= 1=4¾2[(fA)2 + (fB)2] = 1=2¾2(fA)2
18To see this, notice that a social planner could enforce an allocation where nobody
trades in the swaps.
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sharing instruments. Magill and Quinzii (1998) have shown that in a setup
with individual risk and individual moral hazard, this mechanism leads to
allocations in which full possible insurance is not obtained. Allocations are
moreover constrained pareto-e¢cient. This argument of what is essentially
coinsurance breaks down here since the individual household cannot change
the valuation of the risk sharing instrument because the latter conditions on
aggregate output and thus obtains maximum insurance.
It should be noted that taxation in the model does not arise because of the
governments pursuing interests contradicting the interest of the households
in the …rst place: the governments maximizes the utility of their countries
households. But in doing so, it creates the distortion. If the governments
would not care about households utility, the …rst best would be achieved!19
2.7 The Assumptions of the Model
The model makes some important assumption about the incompleteness of
the contracts and their enforceability, the observability of countries output
and the lack of commitment possibilities for the government. In the following,
these assumptions will be discussed.
Incompleteness of the Contracts The model assumes that the only
tradable risk sharing instrument is a swap in the countries output. It is
easy to see that if it could also be contracted on the tax rate, the …rst best
solution is obtained: the contract would simply require the payment of a
su¢ciently high penalty for the residents of a country where the tax rate
is not zero. While such a contract could be feasible for the above model of
capital taxation, it should be kept in mind that capital taxation just stands as
an example for policies which reduce output at the bene…t of an other policy
19The result that a benevolent government may not be optimal is not new. In the case of
central banks it is well known that appointing a central banker which is more conservative
than the public may be preferred (Eij¢nger et. al.[1995]). In the case here, the public
could elect a government which also puts weight on the utility of foreign agents. The
rationale for this is that taxation aims at increasing payments for domestic households
through the swaps but, of course, this will increase the payments of foreign households by
the same amount. If the government puts equal weight on domestic and foreign households,
the only e¤ect of taxation will be a distortion, thus the government will set the tax rate
to zero. However, in practice, the election of a government which cares equally about
foreign agents will have further consequences which may not be desired by the domestic
households.
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goal. A contract which shall achieve the …rst best would need to condition on
all these policies, which is not feasible. The present model shall thus simply
represent an incomplete market setting where contracts cannot condition on
all possible government instruments.
Enforceability International contracts are typically subject to enforce-
ability problems because countries are sovereign.20 The scope for default
reduces here from the outset since the contracts are not made between gov-
ernments but by individuals: the households are simply subject to the private
law of the country in which the trade is based. However, this is not a su¢-
cient conditions: the government could simply protect domestic individuals
against legal suits (or even deter them from making payments in case the in-
dividuals want to ful…ll obligations, see Diaz-Alejandro[1983] for a historical
example). Nevertheless, appropriate design of the settlement of the swaps
can solve the problem. Analogous to existing practice in future markets,
the exchange organizing the trade could simply require a margin from the
households to be paid in advance (as a kind of security). The swap itself is
then marked to market on a periodical basis (i.e., daily), the resulting gains
and losses for the households in the two countries are credited and debited
to their margin account. If the deposits fall below a certain threshold, the
households have to make additional payments. If they refuses to do so (or
the government deters him from doing so), the swap contract is simply ter-
minated. This does not result in any losses for the other side of the contract,
simply because the value of the contract at the time of default is be zero
(since it is marked to market). If such a technique is applied to the settling
of the swaps, then trade in these swaps do not pose any problems di¤erent
from existing trade in futures (which is also international!).21
Observability of the Countries Output In fact, alternatively to
taxing capital, the government could simply underreport the output (or tar-
20See Obstfeld and Rogo¤ [1996], chapter 6.1, for a treatment of the enforceability
problem.
21For a more detailed description of the settlement of futures, see Hall (1993), chapter
2. To apply the proposed technique to the model requires some adaptations: …rst, there
has to be frequent trading in the swap between the two periods. Moreover, the shocks "A
and "B have to be reinterpreted as the sum of small shocks occurring between the two
periods. Further technical complications arise such as the pricing of the contracts (now
also capital gains and losses are possible) which will not be discussed further here.
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get production towards non-market activities) if output cannot observed by
other parties. This problem has already been recognized by Shiller (1993).
He suggests a group of experts who design indices for measuring the output
of a country. In terms of the model, settlement in the swaps would then take
place on basis of the calculations of these experts.
Commitment of the Government The model assumes that the gov-
ernment cannot commit. If however, the government can commit to a certain
tax rate, the …rst best could be achieved by committing to a zero tax. It
seems interesting to extend the above model to a dynamic model where the
government concerns about its reputation, for example because the detection
of adverse behavior of the government could result in exclusion international
risk sharing markets (similar to the analysis in Obstfeld and Rogo¤[1996],
chapter 6.1., where the scope for sovereign default is reduced by the threat
of exclusion from international …nancial markets or Atkeson[1991]). How-
ever, the following problems do arise. First, unlike in models of sovereign
default the government is not part of the contract, thus sanctions against it
are di¢cult to justify. Moreover, as argued above, the government has many
policies of a¤ecting output. Even if it wants to commit, it would have to
do so by committing on virtually all kinds of policies. Lastly, not all of the
policies can be observed by outsiders (not to talk of veri…cation!), thus even
if the government does not stick to its commitment, this cannot easily be
detected. It is thus di¢cult to imagine, what form commitments may take
and how reputational arguments shall work, the model thus refrains from
issues of commitment (and a dynamic analysis). In section 4 however, the
issue of governmental commitments will be discussed further.
3 Extensions
In the following, some modi…cations to the model will be discussed. The
focus is on the question whether there are, despite the …nding of welfare
losses in the model, incentives to introduce these markets. This is of interest
for the policy considerations in section 4. Such incentives could exist for
private pro…t-seeking organizations, further for some of the governments in
case countries are a¤ected di¤erentially by the macro markets (such that
they are welfare enhancing for some countries while reducing welfare on the
world level). Further, it is of interest whether the …ndings of the model will
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emerge as robust.
The Timing The model assumes that the government sets the tax rate
after trade has taken place in the swaps. If the government can set the tax
rate before trade takes place (but cannot change the taxation afterwards),
the government can in fact commit to a tax rate and sets the tax rate to zero
(…rst best). In reality however, government can change the taxes at any time.
If this is the case, taxation remains at 100%. The reason for this is as follows.
The model shows that there is no in‡uence of government behavior on the
markets (in terms of volume). Thus, no matter what the government does,
households hold half of world output at the end of the …rst period (before
investment takes place) and the government reacts to this with a taxation of
100%.
The Small Country Case In the case of B being a small country, it
can be shown (see appendix C) that the share of output insured is larger than
1=2 in B and smaller than 1=2 in A. Moreover, households in A have to pay
a premium to the households in B. This is the case since, in contrast to the
symmetric case, the demand for long positions in the swap is higher (there are
now more households in A). Consequently, this drives the maturity price of
the future up. Further by means of simple arithmetic, average swap positions
per household in A have to be smaller than in B. Capital taxes in B are
then higher than in A re‡ecting the higher amount of output insured. The
overall e¤ect on welfare is not obvious: on one hand, due to the introduction
of the markets the households in B can insure large parts of their output and
receive moreover a payment for entering the swap contract, but on the other
hand there is a higher capital tax.
A World With More Than Two Countries As the number of na-
tions increase, households have more diversi…cation possibilities and thus
wish to short a larger part of their countries output in return. This causes
an even higher capital taxation by the government for all countries.
Di¤erences in Output Variances If the riskiness of the output di¤ers
between the countries, they swap, as shown in appendix D, half of their
output in the case that both have the same expected output. Moreover, there
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is no premium to be paid on future positions by either of the two sides.22
Thus the country with the higher output variance gains relatively more due
to the higher (absolute) reduction in consumption volatility although both
have to bear the same capital tax.23
Unilateral Claims In our model, due to the construction of the swap,
households are forced when buying claims to foreign output also to short
their own nations output. It is this shorting which causes the government to
levy a tax. One could ask whether results change if one allows for two futures
being traded instead: one a claim to country A’s-output and the other to
country B0s? As shown in appendix E, equilibrium positions in these two
futures exactly replicate the former positions in the swap, thus households
still short half of their countries income. Hence taxation does not change.
The consideration of unilateral claims gives rise to another interesting
question: What happens if there is only one unilateral claim? Appendix E
reveals that the equilibrium future positions in the two future markets are
independent, thus removal of one market does not e¤ect the outcome in the
other market. Imagine a world were there is only one future traded: a claim
to countries A’s output. Then appendix E shows that country B buys half
of country A’s output.24 The government in B does not raise a tax since
there are no externalities involved in investment while capital tax in country
A is still 100% since half of the output is shorted. Country B gains from the
introduction of the future due to the new investment possibility, country A
has despite the gains from the introduction from the market also to bear the
costs of the distortion.
22In the case of B having a higher variance than A and expected output in A being
higher than in B, the share of output swapped will be smaller than 1/2 and households in
A will have to pay a premium on the swap. If expected output in A is smaller than in B,
more than half of the output will be shared and households in A receive a premium (see
appendix D). Taxation will vary accordingly but will be identical across countries.
23This and the above results for the multi-country and small country-case are well known
regarding the asset positions, see for example Shiller (1997). However, the diversi…cation
triggers here a tax response by the governments which will induce additional welfare e¤ects.
24The future can be seen as an investment of households in country B in output of
country A: they pay a …xed price p1 and receive an uncertain return f(k)(1 + "A). In
appendix E it is further shown that the maturity price of the future will be less than the
expected output of A, thus there is a positive expected return on the asset.
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Macro Markets on a Small Scale For the case of the introduction
of a macro market, it will be likely that only a few agents use the new
instrument. This may be the case due to di¤erent costs of hedging for the
agents, or it may simply be the case that an understanding of this risk-
managing concept still has to be developed in the population (as argued in
Shiller [1993]). How does the government tax in such a setting? Can a macro
market on a small scale have positive welfare e¤ects for the households active
in the market while being detrimental to the others? To answer this question,
consider the above model and moreover assume that the macro markets are
only available to a fraction r of the population of the two countries (0 <
r < 1), called the active households. These households still want to swap
half of their output, thus qAir = 1=2 and q
B
ir = ¡1=2 , while the rest of
the households is per assumption not engaged in the future: qAi>r = 0 and
qBi>r = 0. The resulting average positions in the market are q
A = rqAir+(1¡
r)qAi>r = r=2 and q
B = rqBir + (1¡ r)qBi>r = ¡r=2. The governments set the
tax rate according to equation (9) to tA = qA=(1 ¡ qA) = r=(2 ¡ r) = tB.25
Thus, all households su¤er losses due the distortionary tax but the in the
macro market active households also gains from diversi…cation. By making r
small, the losses per household can be made arbitrarily small while the gains
per active household remain constant. Hence, there exists a cut-o¤ value r
such that for all r < r the active households gain from the introduction of
the market. This can explain in terms of political economy considerations
pressure from groups who are likely to be the active ones to introduce the
markets. This would typically be …nancial intermediaries.
Monopolies in the Macro Markets Imagine that a single govern-
ment considers selling claims to its own output to foreign households in a
world where no macro markets do yet exist. In doing so, the government
takes two e¤ects into account: …rst, it can extract monopoly rents by selling
the futures at a premium and give the receipts to the domestic households.
On the other hand, insuring output results in an optimal capital tax larger
than zero which causes an utility-reducing distortion of the investment deci-
sion. It is not obvious whether there are situations in which the …rst e¤ect
dominates and thus whether there is an incentive for the government to sell
25The size of the negative externalities of investment depends only on the amount of
national output insured. Thus the distribution will not matter and equation (9) can be
readily applied.
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the claims. Consider now however, a (symmetric) multi-country world where
the …rst e¤ect dominates. This results in a race for being the …rst one to
o¤er these markets since the bene…ts from introducing a new claim are de-
teriorating with the number of countries already selling such contracts. The
reason for the latter is that competition is higher then and thus monopoly
rents decrease (and eventually become zero), moreover demand for such new
contracts decreases re‡ecting the decreasing marginal utility from diversi…-
cation. Thus, while it may be in the beginning bene…cial for a country to
sell claims to its own output, once a number of markets have been set up,
there are no premiums to be extracted from the future and the distortionary
e¤ect dominates.
Private Operation The most obvious case for the introduction of
macro markets is by private institutions. They can gain by collecting fees
from the traders in these markets. Traders can be households, …rms and
…nancial intermediaries, such as pension funds.26 ;27 Moreover, in the case of
a single or only a few markets, monopoly rents may be extracted.
Other Policy Instruments The model considers a capital tax as the
instrument of government policy. In practice however, the government has a
whole range of possibilities to decrease output at the bene…t of other goals,
such as for example ruling longer vacation times or lowering public invest-
ment. In principal the same mechanism as in the model will arise: households
price the anticipated government taxation into the future but equilibrium
swap trade will not change. Thus the full moral hazard problem as described
in the model arises.
4 Implications for Policy
4.1 Is There a Need for Action?
Given incentives to introduce the macro markets by private organizations and
possibly by some governments, should one worry about the potential welfare
26See Marshall (1992) for a treatment of macro swaps designed to hedge …rms risk.
27Shiller (1997) argues that pension funds will o¤er tailor-made contracts on top of
existing contracts to insure households against aggregate risk. These fund would then go
short in macro markets to hedge their risk.
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losses? There is of course a chance that governments resists the tempta-
tion of carrying out a policy being detrimental to output; if so, one should
wait what happens before restrictive measures are taken. For instance, it is
sometimes argued that existing international portfolio diversi…cation poses a
similar temptation, though one has not yet experienced adverse government
behavior due to that.28 This is in contrast to the models prediction that
the government should even react to a small insurance of output. A possible
explanation is that such a behavior simply has not been noticed yet. Given
that the international diversi…cation is far from being perfect such a behavior
had to be small anyway and moreover no government would be keen to make
it public.
A further argument also speaks against a policy of wait-and-see: once the
markets are introduced they may be di¢cult to abolish. As seen in section 3,
agents who are active in the markets gain di¤erentially more than the other
ones and may start lobbying against any government inference. Lastly, a ban
of the markets after introduction results in considerable single losses for the
domestic households: after the abolition of the markets the government will
bring the tax rate down and output increases, this results in transfers from
domestic to foreign households through the existing swaps.
4.2 Discussion of Possible Measures
There are two kinds of actions which could be possibly taken: one is to
directly restrict trade in the macro markets (or in the extreme case to ban
them) or to take measures which reduce the moral hazard. It should be clear
that any action had to be initiated by the government since if markets are
operated by private organizations they have no incentive to regulate in the
…rst place. This is the case because, …rst, due to the settlement of the swaps
they face no enforceability problems and, second, the demand for the swaps
in the market is not a¤ected by the adverse e¤ects of the swaps.29
Modi…cation of the Risk Sharing Instruments The results of the
model hinge on the incompleteness of the contracts (and thus the market):
28This argument is put forward in Shiller (1993). Once could view such a temptation in
terms of the model as the government riding a policy of reducing pro…ts of internationally
owned …rms at the bene…t of domestic agents (e.g., a pro…t tax).
29It has been shown above that q = 1=2 no matter what the taxation of the government
is.
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neither it is possible to contract on the states of natures (i.e., the shock), nor
can capital taxation or investment be observed. The justi…cation for the …rst
assumption is simply that states of nature cannot be observed or veri…ed.
The latter assumptions were justi…ed in section above by recognizing that
the capital tax acts for other government policies, to include all of them into
the contract is not feasible. Nevertheless, it may be worthwhile to further
interrogate into feasible contracts which condition on variables beside the
nations output and look at their equilibrium e¤ects on welfare. This may
be in the spirit of the existing literature on moral hazard,30 however with
speci…c restrictions on the feasibility of the contracts.
An interesting extension to the model even if one sticks to the assumptions
on the incompleteness of the markets is to combine the swaps with options
on countries outputs. The thus resulting non-linearity may make it di¢cult
to internalize households behavior by taxation and other measures.31 Magill
and Quinzii (1999) for example show that the introduction of options can
ensure the …rst best in a stock market equilibrium with individual moral
hazard.
The Government Commits Throughout the paper it was assumed
that the government cannot commit, this was rationalized by the complexity
of the possible policy instruments, their non-observability and the fact that
the government is not part of the risk sharing contracts in the …rst place.
However, it may plausible to assume that in the long run adverse government
actions may be detected. The resulting loss of reputation may cause exclusion
from the risk sharing markets and further consequences such as unfavorable
conditions for other international contracts.32 There may thus be potential
scope for commitments.33 However, it is not clear how this idea could be
transferred into an concrete incentive for the current government given the
length of political cycles.
30There exists a wide range of literature studying optimal contracts under moral hazard,
for example Grossman and Hart (1982) and Brander and Spencer (1989) which concerns
about the manager of a …rm being subject to moral hazard. However, their concepts
cannot readily be applied since here the agent who enters the contract (the household) is
not the one who is subject to moral hazard (the government).
31This may be especially true in the case of heterogenous agents.
32For an analysis in this spirit see Atkeson (1991)
33There may also be psychological arguments: the government may, beside its re-election
probability, also concern about heading a country with economic prosperity (status) and
put weight on domestic output itself.
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A potential way to overcome the problems caused by the time inconsis-
tency is to create an independent organization which watches the government.
Payments from the contracts would then be made contingent on decisions of
this institution. For example, if the institution …nds the government to have
behaved adversely, settlement could take place by setting the output of the
country in question to zero. The advantage of this approach is that it does
not require the government to commit or to bind itself into a contract. The
institution who watches the government would be set up by the private or-
ganization o¤ering the macro market and individuals would have to agree
to the settlement conditions. A government facing households who are in-
sured through such contracts may then think twice before it runs the risk
of being found to behave adversely. However, it is very di¢cult for such an
institution to objectively decide about the governments behavior. Even if
governmental behavior were fully observable, it cannot be deducted whether
a certain policy is really meant at reducing output or whether it is just an
optimal response of the government to changed economic conditions (such as
a shock). Surely, there are cases where the institution takes a wrong decision.
The resulting risk for the households may be larger than the potential gains
from the reduction in risk through the contracts. Furthermore, the setup of
such an institution causes considerable costs.
Changing Government Incentives Another approach is to directly
change the incentives for the government by giving politicians rewards de-
pending on the countries output. This clearly sounds futuristic. However,
such rewards are already proposed for monetary policy issues34 and should
be taken into account for further discussion.
Restricting Trade in the Market By banning macro markets, gov-
ernments could get rid of all the problems mentioned above, however, the
advantages of these markets would be gone as well. Alternatively to a ban,
governments could also tax the contracts so as to internalize the negative ex-
ternalities arising from it. This would leave the possibility of welfare gains in
case of heterogeneous agents: households with a high risk-aversion may still
…nd it worthwhile to engage in the market. A further less stringent action
is to forbid short selling in its own output and thus keeping the opportunity
34Walsh (1995) outlines the theoretic rationale for such contracts.
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to diversify by buying claims to foreign output. However, this would con-
siderably reduce the gains since now households cannot hedge own income
anymore.
But would a ban of macro markets be e¤ective at all? A unilateral ban
will not be since the location of the macro market is independent of the
assets traded: other countries can provide these markets as well. In fact
only a single country providing these macro markets would be needed to
make the bans ine¤ective. This country could in fact extract large monopoly
rents by selling hedging contracts to other countries of the world.35 The
problem clearly becomes an international issue: bans are only e¤ective if
either markets are banned worldwide, otherwise capital mobility has to be
restricted.
5 Summary and Conclusions
This paper asked whether risk-sharing achieved by asset trade can induce
a change in government policy and thus have, beside the gains from risk-
sharing, further welfare e¤ects. The paper considered international risk shar-
ing which is obtained by trading in assets that are claims to countries output
(macro markets). The issue was addressed within the context of a general
equilibrium model of two countries with stochastic production where an as-
set market with a swap in national output exists and the government can
levy capital taxes. The motivation for the introduction of the tax is that the
government can use it to distort investment decisions against production and
thus to increase the payments from the swap for the domestic households. It
turns out that even though households anticipate such government behavior,
they still sell half of their countries’ output as in the case without capital
taxes. The e¤ect arises because households do not take the negative external-
ities of holding positions in the contract into account. Ultimately, this results
in a capital tax of 100%. Gains from diversi…cation are therefore opposed
by losses due to the distortion, the overall e¤ects are likely to be negative.
Although the model uses a capital tax as the government instrument, this is
not the only instrument to react to an insured output: labor taxation for ex-
ample does so as well; in general all policies which a¤ect output. It should be
further emphasized that the analysis did not rely on particular assumptions
such as a speci…c utility function. The paper also considered some extensions
35This country would occupy a similar niche as existing ’tax heavens’ do for example.
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to the model, they left the predictions regarding a high taxation basically
untouched but also suggested that di¤erential welfare e¤ects for the countries
can arise. The somehow counterintuitive …nding of a likely welfare reduction
through the introduction of a new risk sharing market is in stark contrast to
the existing literature.36 It arises, …rst, because of the separation of the agent
who is subject to moral hazard from the agent who actually makes the risk
sharing agreements and, second, because the latter cannot change the valua-
tion of the risk sharing assets through its own behavior (since aggregate risks
are shared). This setup would also motivate a more detailed analysis of new
type of contractual relationship, namely a principal-agent model in which a
set of identical agents themselves elect a further agent (the government) and
delegate some power to him (taxation).
Since private institutions can gain by introducing macro markets (they
can collect fees or receive monopoly rents) and further some governments may
have an incentive to introduce these markets, unregulated macro markets
would in the light of the results pose a serious threat. Moreover, continuing
international asset diversi…cation by means of conventional markets causes
similar problems. The paper considered macro markets as the origin of in-
surance of the countries’ production, however, international equity markets
can lead to insurance as well: if the equities of a country are mainly hold by
foreigners, this amounts to insurance of the pro…ts of the country. Similar in-
centive problems will arise.37 The paper then examined some measures which
can possibly overcome the problems caused by the markets. One direction of
such measures targets toward a richer …nancial structure by extending and
adding risk sharing contracts. Another direction deals with commitments
of the government and an institution which watches the government. How-
ever, the discussion reveals that no readily available way out seems to be
available, a more detailed examination is needed (which is behind scope of
paper). Lastly, the paper considered some versions of restricting the trade
in the market. Here issues are not simple as well, e.g., a total ban is only
e¤ective if carried out on a supranational level.
36E.g., in Green (1987), Kahn (1988), Greenwood and Williamson (1989), Gertler and
Rogo¤ (1990), Kocherlakota (1998) and Magill and Quinzii (1998 and 1999) welfare can
not shrink due to the new markets.
37The reason for concentrating on macro markets in this paper is purely for simpli…ca-
tion, considering trade in equity will raise complications such as the relationship between
pro…ts and production of a economy and the problem that not all of the equity of a country
is traded, thus a high degree of insurance cannot easily be obtained.
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It is sometimes argued that moral hazard is not really posing a threat
since a high degree of international risk sharing is unlikely to arise due to
problems of enforceability and the moral hazard problem itself. The analysis
contradicts this view for the following reasons. First, already a very small
part of the country being insured triggers an adverse behavior by the govern-
ment. Second, problems of enforceability are reduced due to the construction
of the risk sharing instruments. Lastly, and most important, the model shows
that the threat of moral hazard itself does not restrict the risk sharing.
The paper was targeted at risk-sharing in output, however similar prob-
lems should be expected for other macro markets as well: whenever a cen-
tralized body can in‡uence the pay-o¤s from the contract, there will the
temptation to exploit this.38 The paper moreover contributed to the litera-
ture on asset markets and moral hazard. It challenges the result that asset
trade leads to constrained pareto-optimal allocations when trades are observ-
able: if assets are traded across heterogeneous agents, government inference
can make the second best not achievable.39 Since these models partly aim at
explaining the equity premium and the home bias puzzle, the …ndings can
possibly have some implications for these puzzles. This is left for future re-
search. Lastly, the model gives an example for the case that the introduction
of a new market leads to a welfare reduction, in contrast to other examples
in the literature, the e¤ect does not rely on feedback to existing markets.
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A Appendix: Swap Positions in the Assym-
metric Equilibrium
Proof that for fA > fB the following expression
°(cA2 )(f
A)2 + °(cB2 )(f
B)2





is larger than 1=2 if °(cA2 ) > °(c
B
2 ) and smaller than 1=2 if °(c
A
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, °(cA2 )(fA)2 + °(cB2 )(fB)2 > °(cA2 )(fB)2 + °(cB2 )(fA)2
, (°(cA2 )¡ °(cB2 ))((fA)2 ¡ (fB)2) > 0
B Appendix: Welfare Analysis for Quadratic
Utility
First, an expression for the utility of the households before the introduction
of the swaps will be computed. In the absence of a macro market, taxation
is zero (tA = tB = 0). Since countries are symmetric and households are
identical, there can be no holdings of bonds bAi = b
A = bBi = b
B = 0. The
budget equations (1) and (2) simplify to (dropping individual and country
subscripts):
c1 + k = y0 (25)
c2 = f(k)(1 + ") (26)
Individuals maximize their intertemporal utility according to









(quadratic utility with risk aversion parameter ®) and home production takes
place according to a linear production function f(k) = ± ¢ k. The quadratic
utility-function makes di¢culties in that the (expected) marginal utilities of
consumption 1 ¡ ®c1 and E1[1 ¡ ®c2] = 1 ¡ ®±k can become negative for
larger values of ®, c1 and ±k. To rule this out, it will be required that the
following conditions are met:
1¡ ®y0 > 0 and 1¡ ®±y0 > 0 (28)
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This ensures that neither when the household invest nothing (c1 = y0) nor
when it invest everything (k = y0) the expected marginal utilities of consump-
tion can become negative.40 From the condition for the optimal investment
(derived from (6)) u0(c1) = ¯E1[u0(c2)f 0(k)(1 + ")] one obtains
1¡ ®(y0 ¡ k) = ¯E1[(1¡ ®±k(1 + "))±(1 + ")] (29)
= ¯±[1¡ (1 + ¾2)®±k]
Solving for the k yields
k =
®y0 + ¯± ¡ 1
®+ (1 + ¾2)®¯±2
(30)
Now …rst and second period consumption can be derived from (25) and
(26), from (27) one gets an expression for the utility of a household:
U0 =
1 + ¯2±2 + ¯±(®y0(2¡ (1 + ¾2)(®y0 ¡ 2)± ¡ 2)
2(®+ (1 + ¾2)®¯±2
(31)
Next, the utility after the introduction of the swaps will be computed.
From section 2.5 it is known that households swap half of the output (q =
1=2), that equilibrium taxation is 100% (t = 1) and that the price of the
future is zero (p = 0). The budget equations are then
c1 + T = y0 + 2k (32)




where T = k in equilibrium. Plugging this into the equation for op-
timal investment of a country A household (equation (6)) (1 + t)u0(c1) =
40However, ex post second period marginal utility (and also second period utility) can
always become negative since the shock " has the interval (¡1;1) as support. This will
make it unreasonable to draw inferences from the analysis for high values of the shock
variance ¾2 since then negative realizations of second period (marginal) utility become
more frequent, see below.
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¯E1[u
0(c2)f 0(k)(1 + "A)] yields
2(1¡ ®(y0 ¡ k)) = ¯E1[(1¡ ®±k(1 +
"A + "B
2
))±(1 + "A)] (34)










®+ 1=2(1 + ¾2=2)®¯±2
(35)
Plugging this into (32) and (33) and subsequently into the utility function
(27) gives an expression for the new utility:
U1 =
1
2®(4 + (2 + ¾2)¯±2)2
¢ (36)
(16 + ¯±(¡32 + (2 + ¾2)(y0)2®2±(¡8¡ (2 + ¾2)¯±2 +
2y0®(2 + (2 + ¾
2)±)(8 + (2 + ¾2)¯±2) +
2¯±(6 + (2 + ¾2)±(¡2 + ¯±))))
For the evaluation of the change in welfare as represented by the di¤er-
ence in households utilities (U1 ¡ U0), the productivity and time preference
parameter are set to one (± = 1 and ¯ = 1). The potential gains from the
risk sharing are expected to increase with the variance of the output-shock
¾2 and the degree of risk aversion ® (clearly, if either ¾2 = 0 or ® = 0, there
are no potential gains from risk sharing). To obtain a conservative value for
the possible welfare losses, a standard deviation of the output growth of 10%
will be assumed (this is a high …gure compared for example with a standard
deviation of consumption growth of around 3% for the U.S., see van Win-
coop[1999]). Plugging this values into the equations for U0 and U1, setting
the di¤erence to zero and solving for the risk-aversion, one …nds that for
® > 1:736=y0, U1 is higher than U0, otherwise U1 is smaller than U0. How-
ever, ® > 1:736=y0 violates condition (28), in fact …rst and second period
expected marginal utility are negative. Thus, for all admissible combina-
tions of the risk aversion and the endowment, the introduction of the swap
leads to a welfare reduction.
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The apparent dependence of the sign of (U1¡U0) on ® and y0, as suggested
by the expression ® > 1:736=y0, is simply the result of the fact that with
quadratic utility a rising initial endowment y0 causes the maximum value of
the risk aversion which still guarantees positive expected marginal utilities
to fall. The e¤ect arises, loosely speaking, because a too large endowment
leading to negative marginal utilities (since endowment cannot be destroyed)
can make an otherwise ine¢cient allocation preferable, simply because it
reduces the goods available for consumption.
For higher standard deviations of the output (¾ = 0:2 and ¾ = 0:3) the
limits for ® (in fact ® = 1:531=y0 and ® = 1:371=y0) lie also outside the range
of admissible parameters. However, more general results cannot reasonably
be obtained since an even higher variance further increases the likelihood of
negative ex-post second period utility and second period marginal utility.
C Appendix: Countries With Di¤erent Sizes
Imagine that households in country A have a measure of n, while the house-
holds in B still have a measure of unity. The market clearing equation for
the future market is then nqA + qB = 0. From the price equations (14) and











Independent of the output in the two countries, n
n+1
-swaps are traded.
This number rises with an increase in the size of A (in the limit case n ! 1,
country B will fully insure its output). If average output in B is not larger





is positive and rises with n. Plugging the values for qA and qB in the
equation for the optimal taxation (9) gives: tA = 1=n and tB = n.
D Appendix: Countries With Di¤ering Out-
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put Variance
Let ¾A and ¾B the standard deviations of the output shocks in countries A




[(¾A)2 + (¾B)2][(fA)2 + (fB)2]
; (39)
p = fB ¡ fA + °(¾A)2(¾B)2 (f
A)2 ¡ (fB)2
(¾A)2 + (¾B)2
The amount of output swapped is larger than 1=2 in the case of ¾A < ¾B
if fA < fB and smaller than 1=2 if fA > fB (see appendix A and substitute
¾A and ¾B by °(cA2 ) and °(c
A
2 ) respectively).
E Appendix: Equilibrium With Two Unilat-
eral Claims to Output
De…ne futures 1 and 2 which give a claim to fA(1 + "A) and fB(1 + "B) re-
spectively and maturity prices p1 and p2. The second period budget equation
(2) for a household in country A is then
bAi (1 + r) + f(k
A
i )(1 + "
A) + qA1;i[f
A(1 + "A)¡ p1] +
qA2;i[f
B(1 + "B)¡ p2] = cAi;2
and for country B
bBi (1 + r) + f(k
B
i )(1 + "
B) + qB1;i[f
A(1 + "A)¡ p1] +
qB2;i[f
B(1 + "B)¡ p2] = cBi;2











= 0! ) E1[u0(cAi;2)(fB(1 + "B)¡ p2)] = 0 (41)
analog for country B. Transforming these equations using Stein’s lemma
one obtains price equations for country A’s positions:
p1 = f
A ¡ ¾2°(1 + qA1 )(fA)2; p2 = fB ¡ ¾2°qA2 (fB)2 (42)
and for country B
p1 = f
A ¡ ¾2°qB1 (fA)2; p2 = fB ¡ ¾2°(1 + qB2 )(fB)2 (43)
Using the market clearing conditions qA1 + q
B




2 = 0 one
obtains qA1 = ¡1=2; qB1 = 1=2; qA2 = 1=2; qB2 = ¡1=2. Thus every country
shorts half of its own income and is long in half of the foreign income. From
(42) and (43) it can be seen further that the respective prices of the futures
are p1 = fA¡ 12¾2°(fA)2 and p2 = fB¡ 12¾2°(fB)2. The maturity price of the
future is less than expected output since the long side receives a compensation
for the risk of the claim (while the short side has a riskless position).
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